Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery

This paper argues that global security can no longer be evaluated in the realist terms of the sovereignty of nations, and that global insecurity does not arise merely from a handful of relatively straightforward issues. As an analytical tool, this paper turns instead to the concept of “complex interdependence” put forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. This paper then demonstrates how transnational bribery damages the quality of transnational relationships, thus endangering global security. The paper concludes by examining empirical observations. Empirically, transnational bribery has contributed significantly to global instability. On the other hand, no empirical observations suggest that extraterritorial control of transnational bribery leads to global disharmony, or decreases the level of commerce or cooperation among nations.